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Abstract
We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral
agents and two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance
has the standard e®ect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to
get a suitable job. We show, through calibrations, how the mere di®erence
on unemployment coverage, when countries experience a common skilled-
biased technological shock, may result in di®erences in unemployment,
productivity growth and wage inequality. These results are consistent
with the contrasting performance of the labour market in Europe and
the United States in the last twenty ¯ve years. The model is used to
address some political economy issues.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present a simple equilibrium search-matching model of the
labour market with two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. The predictions of this
model are shown to be consistent with some salient features of the contrasting
evolution of labour markets in Continental Western Europe and the United
States. In particular, we focus on three observations. First, unemployment has
risen dramatically in Europe, whereas it exhibits no such trend in the United
States. Second, the productivity per worker has increased much faster in Europe
than in the United States. Third, wage inequality has increased to a much larger
extent in the United States than in Europe.
European unemployment increased, from an average of 4% in the early 70’s
to more than 11% in the mid 80’s and, then, persistently remained very high. In
the United States the unemployment rate was around 5% in 1975, and around
6% in 1994. The rising level of unemployment in Europe has been associated
with decreasing rates of exit from unemployment (and fairly stationary rates
of entry), longer duration of unemployment, and growing incidence of long-
term unemployment (see, for example, Alogoskoufls et al. 1995). In the United
States, instead, both the in°ows and out°ows are stationary and unemployment
spells tend to be short. The unemployment gap notwithstanding, the total GDP
growth in Europe has been similar to that in the United States over the last
25 years. In the period 1975-93, the GDP growth rate of the United States
was 2.6% per year, that is about the same as that of Germany (2.5%), France
(2.4%), Italy (2.8%) and Spain (2.5%). Difierent employment growth rates and
similar GDP growth rates imply large difierences in productivity growth; in the
period 1975-94 the average gap between the growth rate of output per worker
in the European Union and the United States was above one per cent per year.
While unemployment has been the main social concern in Europe, wage
inequality, and the raise of the so-called \class of working-poor" which has been
associated with it, has been the \big issue" in the United States. Although
part of this inequality originates from the increasing gap between the earnings
of qualifled groups (college graduates, experienced workers) vs. non-qualifled
groups, it is now well-documented that, in the United States, wage difierences
have grown not only across groups, i.e. between workers with difierent quali-
flcations, but also within groups, i.e. among observationally identical workers
(Gottschalk, 1998; Levy and Murnane, 1992). Within group wage inequality
accounts for at least 50% of the total increase in inequality for men and is,
therefore, a very substantial part of the change that needs to be explained by
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economic theory. Moreover, historically, it was within group inequality which
led, in the 70’s, the upwards trend of earning inequality. An additional impor-
tant observation is that a signiflcant component of the increase in the variance
of wages is due to the increase in the transitory movements in the earnings of
individual workers. Quantitatively, Gottschalk and Mo–tt (1994) document
that one third of the widening of the earnings distribution originates from an
increase in the instability of earnings. This evidence suggests that, in the 90’s
more than in the 70’s, workers in the United States are frequently employed in
technologies where they do not fully beneflt from their speciflc skills. In other
words, this suggests that the extent of mismatch has increased substantially in
the United States.
Wage inequality has increased less dramatically, and, in some cases, not at
all, in other OECD countries. In particular, within group wage inequality has
remained, overall, stationary in Continental Europe. Although the results vary
across studies, to some extent, this type of inequality seems to have remained
practically unchanged throughout the 80’s in Finland, France, Germany and
Italy, and to have only marginally increased in The Netherlands (see Bertola
and Ichino, 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1998). The only major exception
is Sweden (Edin and Holmlund, 1995), a country which started from a very low
level of inequality, however.1
The focus of our analysis is on unemployment beneflts. For this purpose,
we abstract from other important factors (labour market regulations, nominal
rigidities, etc.) which are likely to have played an important role in determining
the contrasting evolution of the labour market experiences on the two sides of
the Ocean (see, among others, Bean, 1994). Our paper adopts a \minimalist
strategy" (i.e., abstract from other institutional difierences) with the aim of
enlightening one of the possible factors which can contribute to explain the
evidence. Previous papers have stressed a variety of channels through which
high replacement ratios can cause high and persistent unemployment. Here we
stress an observation which has been to a large extent neglected by the recent
literature. Unemployment beneflts provide a \search subsidy" (Burdett, 1979)
for giving the unemployed time to flnd, not just a job, but the right job. In
a labour market with search frictions, the existence of unemployment beneflts
tends to reduce job mismatches. In particular, unemployed workers without a
1In the case of Germany, we are not aware of any direct evidence, but we infer the claim
in the text from the fact that neither overall nor across groups inequality has increased.
Within-group inequality has instead increased substantially in Australia, Canada and the
UK.
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\safety net" might accept unsuitable jobs and form what can be identifled with
a class of \working poor." When this safety net is too high, however, workers
become too selective, and reject matches which would have been socially e–cient
to accept.
Our basic idea is that economies which are in all identical except for the
replacement ratio may react very difierently to the occurrence of a common
technological shock, which enhances the importance of mismatch. We argue
that this mismatch-biased shock is related to what other papers have referred
to as skill-biased technical change. To see the source of the similarity, we re-
fer to the observation of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), for the
United States, who show that, starting in the mid-70’s, there is an accelera-
tion of investment-speciflc technological change, associated with a fall in the
price of capital relative to that of labour. Such technological change has been
called skilled-biased technological change, and is consistent with postulating a
relation of complementarity between capital and skilled labour (see Krusell et
al., 1995). In this paper, motivated by the evidence discussed above about
the increase of earning instability and within group wage inequality, we pos-
tulate that there also exists a relation of complementarity between capital and
capital-speciflc-skills (see Violante, 1997, for a similar notion of technical change
in a model where workers’ skills are technology-speciflc). In this case, techni-
cal change would appear to be capital-speciflc-skilled-biased. In the presence of
search frictions, technological change of this nature enhances the relative value
of the \right match", or, equivalently, increases the cost for agents to accept
\unsuitable" jobs.
After characterising the trade-ofi between unemployment and mismatch,
we construct two flctitious economies, equal in all except that one grants and
the other does not grant unemployment beneflts, and choose parameters such
that the two economies have fairly similar (steady-state) unemployment rates,
and could be identifled with the United States and Europe in the mid 70’s.
Then, we simulate the response of these flctitious economies as they are hit
by a common, unexpected permanent shock. Both flctitious economies reach
steady states with features resembling those of the United States and European
economies in the 90’s. That is, the unemployment rate, and the average duration
of unemployment spells, increase sharply in the economy with the more generous
unemployment insurance, where both indicators remain approximately constant
in the other. Furthermore, the growth of productivity per worker is much higher
with than without unemployment beneflts, and wage inequality increases in the
economy without beneflts, whereas it only changes marginally in the one with
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beneflts.
We also address some political economy issues. Unemployment insurance
also has important distributional implications. Increasing insurance typically
makes the unemployed better ofi, while employed workers might either gain
or loose (see also Saint-Paul, 1993 and 1997; Wright 1986). However, even in
a world with risk-neutral (or perfectly insured) agents which take the cost of
flnancing the system into account, workers may support some degree of beneflts
provision, since it both enhances the allocation of talents and strengthen the
bargaining power of all workers by increasing the value of their outside option.
We explore this possibility and, with it, the potential political support for a
reform of unemployment protection policies. In particular, we show that in
a \welfare state" economy, even in the knife-edge case in which the search-
matching equilibrium is e–cient with no unemployment beneflts (see Hosios,
1990), a majority of the workers would have opposed, in the 70’s, to dismantling
the unemployment beneflts system, even if they could perfectly foresee that
preserving the status quo would have caused high unemployment and high taxes.
Our paper builds on a long tradition of equilibrium models of the labour
market, begun with the work of Diamond (1982) and Mortensen (1982). A spe-
ciflc feature of our model is the explicit account of heterogeneity across agents.
Some previous papers dealt with heterogeneity in a difierent way (Acemoglu,
1997a; Jovanovic, 1979; Lockwood, 1986; Moscarini, 1995; Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, 1994). In our paper, heterogeneity is two-sided, i.e. both workers and
flrms are heterogeneous and there are no informational problems. Nevertheless,
due to search frictions, workers and flrms form matches which yield less than
the maximum productivity. Since we focus on symmetric steady-states (such
that in the economy there is a uniform density of unemployed of all types), the
equilibrium of our model resembles that of some existing \stochastic job match-
ing" models (Pissarides, 1985 and 1990), although both the microfoundations
of the theory and the scope of the analysis are substantially difierent.
Among the vast literature which has studied the empirical issues con-
sidered in this paper, the paper that is more closely related to our work is
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). They apply the model of ex-post heterogene-
ity in order to study the difierent performances of OECD labour markets. Their
model is similar to ours in that the \driving force" is an episode of skill-biased
technical change. In their model, this shock enhances productivity difierences
across skills and, therefore, wage inequality (and unemployment difierences) in-
creases across groups, rather than within groups, as in our model. Accordingly,
their work and our work (which have been developed independently) comple-
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ment each other, by showing that the basic equilibrium-search matching model
can be extended to account for difierent performances of labour markets (say,
the United States vs. continental Europe) and that this framework can be of
use to analyse the efiects of difierent labour policies.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is also similar in scope and to some extent
complementary to our work. They stress the distortion on the incentives to
search due to unemployment beneflts in a model where job creation as exoge-
nous. A calibration of the model shows that although unemployment beneflts
have moderate efiects on the aggregate unemployment rate in a situation of
\low economic turbulence" (the 60’s) it can have larger efiects as this turbu-
lence increases (the 80’s). A third paper closely related to our work is Ace-
moglu (1997b), which constructs a model with one-sided heterogeneity, where
flrms open jobs of difierent \qualities". The size of unemployment beneflts and
minimum wages afiects the equilibrium composition of jobs in term of good vs.
bad jobs. This paper, like ours and in contrast with Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998), stresses the existence of channels through which to give workers some
social insurance can be welfare-improving (see also Acemoglu, 1997c).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 characterises the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses political economy issues.
Section 5 presents the results of a calibration of the model, intended to reproduce
the recent experience of Europe and the United States. Section 6 concludes.
An appendix contains the technical details.
2 The model
2.1 Ex-ante heterogeneity and search frictions
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of flrms, workers and ren-
tiers, where both flrms and workers are heterogeneous. In particular, each
worker has a difierent productivity depending on in which flrm he his employed.
Workers are uniformly distributed along a circle of unit length and the total
measure of workers is one. At each moment in time a worker can be either
employed in a certain flrm or unemployed. All unemployed workers search for a
job, and search efiort is costless. Employed workers cannot change job without
going through unemployment (no on-the-job search). Firms are also uniformly
distributed along the same circle of unit length, and the total measure of flrms
is M > 1. At each moment of time a flrm can have a either fllled position, or
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an open vacancy, or be idle. An active flrm with a fllled position employs one
worker, and obtains a revenue from selling the output it produces. An active
flrm with an open vacancy pays a cost to keep the vacancy posted, and is not
productive. Idle flrms pay no cost and earn no revenue. We assume that M
to be su–ciently large so that a positive measure of flrms remain idle in any of
the equilibria analysed here. The rentiers do not work, and each of them holds
a balanced portfolio of shares of all M flrms. The income of a rentier consists
of dividends (possibly negative, in which case he is liable for the losses) plus an
endowment °ow. This endowment is assumed to be su–ciently large to avoid
limited liability issues.2 There is no physical capital, nor other flnancial assets,
and agents consume entirely their income each period.
The productivity of an employed worker depends on the location of the
flrm where he becomes employed, and decreases with the distance between the
worker and the flrm. Let di; j 2 (0; 1
2
) denote the length of the arc between the
location of the flrm (i 2 [0; 2…]) and the location of the worker (j 2 [0; 2…]).
Next, let · :
h
0; 1
2
i
! [·l; ·u] ‰ R
+ be the function mapping distances between
worker-flrm pairs into productivities, where 0 < ·l < ·u <1, and assume that
·
³
1
2
´
= ·l, · (0) = ·u, and ·
³di; j´ is continuous and non-increasing with di; j.
Thus, we interpret di; j as a measure of mismatch between workers and flrms,
and label ·
³di; j´ the mismatch function. A particular mismatch function which
will be used in section 5 is:
·
³di; j´ = max n·l; ·l + a ¢ (1¡ ° ¢ di; j)
o
; (1)
where a > 0 and ° ‚ 2. In this case, a worker’s productivity is linearly decreas-
ing with distance, for all jobs located in an arc of length 2
°
centered around his
location. If he accepts any work outside that arc, the worker’s productivity is
given by the lower bound, ·l.
3
2Alternatively, one could assume that the workers own the ¯rms. Most of the analysis
carried out in this paper would be unchanged under this alternative interpretation. However,
our \political economy" analysis in section 4 relies on the existence of a potential con°ict of
interests between workers and ¯rms, which we regard as a realistic feature, and which would
be drastically reduced if workers owned the ¯rms.
3An alternative way of modelling mismatch, which would give almost identical results, is
to assume that all workers are equally productive upon hiring, and that there is a stochastic
learning process which, at each moment, turns some employed worker into high productivity
`quali¯ed' workers. The learning event is modelled as a Poisson process, whose arrival rate is
a decreasing function of the distance between each worker-¯rm pair. Note that an increase
in relative productivity of `quali¯ed' vs. `unquali¯ed' workers in that version of the model
(i.e., a capital-speci¯c-technological-change) is isomorphic to an increase in the parameter a
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Next, we describe the matching technology. Firms do not sort workers ex-
ante by specifying personal requirements when posting vacancies. This implies
that any unemployed worker can meet and interview with any flrm located at
any point along the circle, with the same probability. The density of interviews
between flrms located at i and workers located at j is an increasing function of
the density of vacancies posted at location i and the density of unemployment
at location j. More formally, let v : [0; 2…]! <+ denote the density of vacancies
at location i and let u : [0; 2…] ! [0; 1] denote the density of unemployment
at location j. The matching function, m : <+ £ [0; 1] ! <+, specifles the
°ow of \interviews" between flrms located at i and workers located at j and
depends positively on v(i) and u(j). As is standard, m(v(i); u(j)) is assumed
to be constant returns to scale. Let q(v(i); u(j)) = m(v(i);u(j))
v(i)
· q(i; j) and
µ(v(i); u(j)) = v(i)
u(j)
· µ(i; j). We make the following standard assumptions:
q(i; j) = q [µ(i; j)] ; q0 [µ(i; j)] < 0; †µ(i;j) ·
dq(i; j)
dµ(i; j)
µ(i; j)
q(i; j
< 1;
limµ(i;j)!0 q
0 [µ(i; j)] =1; limµ(i;j)!1 q
0 [µ(i; j)] = 0:
q(i; j) represents the Poisson probability for a flrm posting a vacancy at i to
interview an unemployed worker located at j, and µ(i; j)q(i; j) represents the
Poisson probability for an unemployed worker located at j to have an interview
with a flrm posting a vacancy at i. Note that neither of these probabilities
depend on di; j. Due to ex-ante heterogeneity, only a fraction of the interviews
which take place at each moment will be regarded as acceptable by workers and
flrms. The determination of this fraction will constitute part of the characteri-
sation of the equilibrium.
Finally, we introduce the following standard notation:
d is the exogenous arrival rate of job separation, which is assumed to be the
same for all matches. Once a job is terminated, the worker returns to
the pool of unemployed (at his original location), and his productivity in
the previous job is irrelevant to the efiects of his future employment. The
flrm, in turn, becomes idle, and can decide whether or not to open a new
vacancy;
r is the interest rate;
c is the hiring expenditure °ow paid by flrms while holding an open vacancy;
b is the unemployment beneflt plus the value of leisure.
in equation (1).
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2.2 Asset price equations
We will assume that there are no informational imperfections, i.e., both workers’
and flrms’ locations are perfectly observed by both parties when interviewing.
First, we write the equations describing the value of a flrm holding an
open vacancy at i 2 [0; 2…]:4
rV (i) =
:
V (i) ¡c+
1
2…
Z i+2¼
i
q [µ(i; ¿)] fMax [J(i; ¿ ); V (i)]g d¿; (2)
where V (i) is the value of a vacancy posted at i,
rJ(i; j) = _J(i; j) + ·
³di; j´¡ w(i; j)¡ d [J(i; j)¡ V (i)] (3)
is the annuity value of a flrm located at i; which has fllled its position with a
worker located at j; and w(i; j) is the wage paid to the worker. Observe that
whenever fllling a job is less profltable than keeping the vacancy, the job match
is not formed, thus (except for cases to be specifled later) the value of a flrm
holding a fllled position can never fall short of the value of a flrm holding an
open vacancy at the same location. We assume that entry in vacancy creation
is free. Since the value of idle flrms is zero, entry will drive down the value of
all vacancies to zero. Thus, in equilibrium:
V (i) = 0; 8i 2 [0; 2…]: (4)
Next, consider the workers’ decisions. Let W (i; j) be the asset value for a
worker located at j to be employed in a flrm located at i. Then:
rW (i; j) = _W (i; j) + w(i; j)¡ d [W (i; j)¡ U (j)] ; (5)
where U denotes the value of being unemployed, and is given by:
rU(j) =
:
U(j) +b+
1
2…
Z j+2¼
j
µ(¿; j)q [µ(¿; j)] fMax [W (¿; j); U(j)]¡ U(j)g d¿
(6)
An acceptable job match generates a rent. We assume that if this rent is
positive, it is shared between the flrm and the worker, according to the Nash bar-
gaining solution. The total surplus is given by S(i; j) = [J(i; j)¡ V (i) +W (i; j)¡ U(j)],
4We do not specify time indices, for convenience, when this causes no confusion.
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and the Nash solution implies that:
W (i; j)¡ U(j) =
fl
1¡ fl
[J(i; j)¡ V (i)] (7)
where fl is a parameter representing the bargaining power of the workers, and
we recall that V (i) = 0 due to free entry. Note that (7) ensures that if a worker
flnds a particular match to be acceptable, so will the flrm, and viceversa (i.e.,
J(i; j) ‚ V (i),W (i; j) ‚ U(j)).
Using the set of equations from (2) to (7), we can obtain the following
expression for the wage rate paid to a worker in the accepted match i; j.
w(i; j) = fl
h
·
³di; j´+ '(j)i+ (1¡ fl)b; (8)
where '(j) · 1
2¼
R j+2¼
j µ(¿; j)q [µ(¿; j)]J(¿; j) d¿ .
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we will characterise the equilibrium. We restrict attention to
initial distributions such that the same proportion of workers are unemployed
at all locations j 2 [0; 2…]. We will start by showing that if a stationary equilib-
rium, it must have a uniform distribution of vacancies at all locations. We then
proceed to characterise the equilibrium, its dynamics and efiects of parameter
changes; in particular, employment beneflts.
Lemma 1 Assume u(j) = u for all j 2 [0; 2…]. Then, a stationary equilibrium
must have v(i) = v for all i 2 [0; 2…] :
Proof: (see Appendix)
This Lemma implies that, 8(i; j) 2 [0; 2…]2, we have µ(i; j) = µ, and that
the Poisson arrival rate of interviews is the same for all unemployed workers (as
well as for all flrms posting a vacancy), irrespective of their location.
3.1 Allocation of talents and vacancy creation
A preliminary important observation which descends from Lemma 1 is that,
in a stationary equilibrium (whereby
:
V (i)=
:
J(i; j)=
:
W (i; j)=
:
U(j)= 0), for all
(i; j) 2 [0; 2…]2 ; we have:
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'(j) = cµ; J(i; j) = J(x); W (i; j) = W (x); U(j) = U; andw(i; j) = w(x);
(9)
where x ·di; j: In words, the value of a flrm with a fllled position, J(i; j), only
depends on the distance between i and j (since this determines the productivity
of the match, ·(x)), but not the speciflc location of i and j along the circle. The
same applies to the value of a job for an employed worker,W (i; j). Furthermore,
the value of unemployment is independent of j, as all workers face the same
expected gain from getting a job in the future.
Recall, next, that Nash bargaining implies that a flrm and a worker always
agree, at the interview, on whether the match is profltable. Formally, a job is
formed whenever J(x) ‚ 0, which implies, by (7), that W (x) ‚ U . There are
two possible alternative cases. In the former case, J (x) > 0 for all x 2 [0; 1
2
];
and all matches are considered as acceptable. In the latter case, there exists
a threshold distance, „x, such that J(„x) = 0 (hence, W („x) = U). Deflne · (x
) ·
R
x
0
´(x)dx
x
, i.e. · is the average productivity of acceptable matches. Then, the
threshold distance satisfles the following condition:
[·(x)¡ b]¡
2fl x µq(µ)
r + d+ 2fl x µq(µ)
h
· (x)¡ b
i
‚ 0 (10)
or, equivalently:
(1¡ fl) [·(x)¡ b]¡ flcµ ‚ 0 (11)
Both (10) and (11) hold with equality if „x < 1
2
.
The algebraic derivation of these conditions is in the Appendix. Equation
(10) has the intuitive economic interpretation of a comparative advantage con-
dition. The reservation distance is such that the value for a worker to accept a
type x job is equal to the value of waiting, i.e. the present discounted expected
value of a future match (when „x = 1
2
waiting is always a dominated option).
Equation (11) states the equivalent condition that the marginal match makes
non-negative proflts.
Next, we characterise the set of pairs (µ; „x) which are consistent with the
free entry condition in vacancy creation (V = 0). In particular, we have:
¡c+
(1¡ fl)2 x q(µ)
r + d+ fl2 x µq(µ)
h
· (x)¡ b
i
= 0; (12)
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which states that the cost for a flrm of holding an open vacancy must be equal
to the expected proflt from fllling the position.
Fig. 1 geometrically represents the equilibrium conditions implied by
equations (11)-(12), when they both hold with equality {. In particular, equa-
tion (11) corresponds to the skill allocation, (SA), while equation (12) corre-
sponds to the vacancy creation, (V C), schedule.
First, consider the skill allocation schedule. The more frequently matches
occur (high µ), the more easily unemployed workers expect to get good job op-
portunities in the future, and the less eager they are to accept low-productivity
jobs with low wages (small x). Thus, in tight labour markets, people seeking
employment tend to be very choosy, and to only accept highly suitable jobs.
Since ·(x) is continuous and bounded, the range of values of µ which satisfy
(11) is also bounded. Provided that ·l > b; there exists µ
¤ > 0 such that
(1 ¡ fl) (·l ¡ b) = flcµ
¤; namely, there exists a su–ciently low matching rate,
such that all jobs, even those implying the largest mismatch, are considered as
acceptable. The particular skill allocation schedule in Fig. 1 corresponds to the
piece-wise linear productivity function of equation (1). In this case, the sched-
ule becomes vertical at µ¤; corresponding to values of x exceeding 1
°
, since all
\bad" jobs located at a distance longer than 1
°
have the same low productivity.
Thus, workers accept jobs along the whole circle (i.e. they set x= 1
2
) if µ < µ¤,
and set the cut-ofi distance below 1
°
; if µ > µ¤:
Consider, next, the vacancy creation, schedule, (12). Determining the
slope of this schedule is less straightforward, as the partial derivative of the
left hand side of (12) with respect to „x has an ambiguous sign. We will prove
below (see the proof of Proposition 1) that this schedule is either backward
bending, as in Fig. 1, or monotonically increasing, as in Fig. 2. Parallel to
the deflnition of µ¤ provided above, we can deflne µ¤¤ as the matching rate
such that c = (1¡¯)q(µ
¤¤)
r+d+¯µq(µ¤¤)
h
„·
³
1
2
´
¡ b
i
, namely µ¤¤ is the labour market tightness
which is consistent with free entry in vacancy creation, when all interviews lead
to employment.
[Figs. 1&2 around here]
The following proposition establishes the properties of the steady-state
equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 1 Assume ·
u
> b. Then:
11
a) There exists, for generic economies, a unique stationary equilibrium pair
(xe; µe):Multiple equilibria can only exist for non-generic economies, whose
parameters are such that µ¤ = µ¤¤.
b) (i) If µ¤ < µ¤¤, then 0 < „xe < 1
2
, and the equilibrium pair (xe; µe) is as
determined by (11) and (12); (ii) if µ¤ > µ¤¤, then „xe = 1
2
and µe = µ¤¤.
Proof. (see Appendix)
Proposition 1 rules out the possibility of multiple equilibria (except for
non-generic cases). If the two schedules cross, then we have the unique interior
equilibrium described by Fig. 1. If they do not cross, then the vacancy creation
schedule is positively sloped everywhere, and we have a corner solution, like in
Fig. 2.
3.2 The dynamics of unemployment, output and productivity
Given, „x and µe, unemployment has the following law of motion:
_ut = d(1¡ ut)¡ 2 x
e
µeq(µe)ut: (13)
The linear difierential equation (13) has a standard interpretation. The
°ow into unemployment is given by the exogenous separations, d(1¡ ut), while
the °ow out of unemployment is given by the probability that an unemployed
worker flnds an acceptable match, 2 xe µeq(µe), times the mass of unemployed at
time t. It immediately becomes evident that if the initial distribution of unem-
ployment is uniform, it remains uniform over time. The solution to the difier-
ential equation (13) is ut = u
¤+(u0¡u
¤)e¡[2x
e
µeq(µe)+d]t; where u¤ = d
d+2x
e
µeq(µe)
is the steady-state unemployment rate to which unemployment monotonically
converges.
Next, consider, the dynamics of output. Deflne gross production at time
t as yt.
5 Gross output has the following law of motion:
:
yt=· (x
e)2 xe µeq(µe)ut ¡ dyt; (14)
where y0 is predetermined. To understand (14), observe that the average pro-
ductivity of new jobs at t will in general difier from that of the jobs terminated
5
We de¯ne as net production the production °ow generated by ¯rms holding a ¯lled
position minus the hiring expenditure °ow su®ered by ¯rms holding a vacant position. Gross
production is equal to net production plus hiring expenditure.
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at t. In particular, the average productivity of the employed workers at t (thus,
the productivity of jobs which are terminated) is a predetermined variable which
depends on past hiring decisions, while the average productivity of new matches
is not predetermined. The latter is equal to · (xe), and the output °ow from
newly created jobs is, therefore, equal to this average productivity times the
°ow of successful matches, 2 xe µeq(µe)ut. The solution to (14) is given by:
yt = y
¤ +
h
(y0 ¡ y
¤)+ · (xe)(u0 ¡ u
¤)
i
e¡dt¡ · (xe)(u0 ¡ u
¤)e¡[2x
e
µeq(µe)+d]t;
(15)
where y¤ = · (xe) 2¹x
eµeq(µe)
d+2¹xeµeq(µe)
is the steady-state equilibrium gross production
levels. The dynamic system is globally stable, thus the economy converges
to y¤; u¤ starting from any pair of initial conditions u0; y0: To determine net
production, flnally, observe that the aggregate hiring expenditure in the economy
is given by cvt = cµut. Thus, net production is equal to zt = yt ¡ cµ
eut.
We conclude with an important remark. Irrespective of the initial distri-
bution of existing matches, the equilibrium converges over time to a stationary
uniform distribution of jobs. More precisely, the steady-state will, at every lo-
cation i 2 [0; 2…], have a density 1 ¡ u¤ of flrms with a fllled position and a
uniform distribution of fllled job (productivities) over the interval x 2 [0; „x]. In
other words, the extent of mismatch will be independent and identically dis-
tributed with respect to the location of workers and flrms. This feature will
be important in the following sections, when we study the efiect of parameter
changes.
3.3 An unexpected change of unemployment beneflts
We will now discuss an important result of comparative statics: the efiect of an
unanticipated increase in unemployment beneflts. We assume that the shock
occurs when the economy is in a steady-state as characterised by the previous
subsection. When b increases, both curves in Figs. 1 and 2 will shift to the left,
and the geometrical analysis followed so far is inconclusive. It can be shown,
however, that when b increases, both the threshold distance and the tightness of
the labour market fall. To see this, we flrst rearrange (10) as follows:
h
· (x)¡ b
i
=
[r + d+ 2fl x µq(µ)]
h
· (x)¡ ·(x)
i
r + d
: (16)
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Next, replacing the left hand-side of (16) into (12), we obtain:
1
q(µ)
¡
8<
:
(1¡ fl)2 x
h
· (x)¡ ·(x)
i
(r + d)c
9=
; = 0 (17)
Equations (11) and (17) provide an alternative characterisation of a(n interior)
equilibrium. The advantage of this formulation is that only (11) is dependent
on b, and this facilitates the geometrical analysis of the comparative statics.
Equation (17) deflnes a positively sloped locus { labeled VCbis in Fig. 3 {
in the plane (µ; „x). This can be shown by observing that 1
q(µ)
is an increasing
function of µ, while d
dx
nh
· (x)¡ ·(x)
i
„x
o
= ¡ x ·0(x) > 0 and using standard
difierentiation. When b grows, the skill allocation schedule shifts to the left, and
the equilibrium has a lower threshold distance as well as a less tight labour mar-
ket. The more generous insurance, the lower is the mismatch and the higher the
productivity per worker in equilibrium. But, at the same time, unemployment
insurance reduces job creation and employment.
[Fig. 3 around here]
3.4 Transitional dynamics after a shock
When the value of some parameter of the model changes unexpectedly (e.g.,
an increase in b), the rents generated by some of the existing matches, which
were profltable before the shock, might turn negative. We must therefore clarify
what happens to the matches which become unprofltable. One could assume
that workers and flrms split the losses associated with the continuation of un-
profltable matches (equation (8) extends to cases in which surplus is negative).
We flnd this option rather unplausible. In particular, it seems unrealistic that
some employed workers have lower welfare than the unemployed. These workers
would prefer to quit their job, and postulating that they are not allowed to quit
is equivalent to introducing some \slavery-type" condition.
There are other possible solutions. For example, assuming that separation
is partially endogenous, i.e., that a job can be destroyed at no cost whatsoever,
as soon as it ceases to be profltable. In this case, unemployment would become
a \quasi-state" variable, which jumps discontinuously in case of unexpected
parameter changes. For instance, after an increase of b, the unemployment rate
would instantaneously jump upwards, from u¤ to u¤+2(„xe
0
¡ „xe
1
)(1¡u¤), where
„xe
0
, „xe
1
denote the equilibrium threshold distances before and after the shock
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respectively (note that, on the contrary, a decrease of b does not cause any
discontinuous jump in unemployment). Our formulation is consistent with this
assumption, although the event of a sudden increase of unemployment due to
massive job destruction seems, also, rather unrealistic.
Another alternative is to introduce dismissal costs.6 To capture employ-
ment protection constraints in a reduced-form fashion, we introduce the alter-
native assumption that, while job termination remains exogenous, whenever
the surplus generated by a job turns negative, the flrm must bear the entire
loss, and pay the worker a salary granting him the same utility which he would
receive if unemployed. Formally, this implies modifying (8) as follows:
w(x) = max [rU; fl [·(x) + cµ] + (1¡ fl)b] : (18)
In words, the worker receives the reservation wage whenever the match generate
a non-positive surplus in an existing job. Under this assumption, unemployment
remains strictly predetermined, and the model predicts more realistic transi-
tional dynamics.7 Although we will stress this last interpretation of the model
when discussing transitional dynamics, most of our results, and in particular
the steady-state analysis, which is the main focus of this paper, are identical in
the two cases.
4 The political economy of unemployment ben-
eflts
The purpose of this section is to analyse how gains and losses from policy
changes are distributed among difierent agents when the unemployment beneflt
system is changed. We start by stating a standard e–ciency result. Consider
a social planner who is only subject to the search frictions and can costlessly
redistribute income among agents (or, alternatively, the planner has no egal-
itarian concern). The planner maximises the present discounted value of the
output stream plus leisure, given initial conditions. The following result can be
established.
6This is also the approach followed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), although their
model has di®erent features.
7A third alternative, following Shaked and Sutton (1983), is to assume that wages are
determined according to w(x) = max [rU; ¯´(x)], derive the equation corresponding to (10)
and show that in that corresponding equation b plays a similar role than under our Nash
bargaining wage determination. With this formulation, wages obey the same contracting rule
after a shock.
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Proposition 2 The competitive search-matching equilibrium with no unem-
ployment beneflts is e–cient, both in terms of job creation and assignments,
if and only if fi = fl.
The proof of this Proposition is provided in Marimon and Zilibotti (1997).
Proposition 2 generalises the well-known result that the equilibrium rate of job
creation is ine–cient when there are search frictions in the labour market, except
for the non-generic case when the elasticity of the matching function is equal
to the bargaining power of workers (Hosios, 1990; Pissarides, 1990; Mortensen
(1996a)). In particular, it establishes that mismatch is generically suboptimal in
a decentralised equilibrium (being either too large or too small) with exogeneous
bargaining powers, but when the Hosios-Pissarides condition is satisfled workers
are e–ciently assigned to jobs.
We now turn to the distributional efiects of changing unemployment bene-
flts. Consider an economy where the unemployed receive a provision equal to b0.
Unemployment and output are at the corresponding steady-state, u0(b0); y0(b0).
Given this steady state, fllled positions are uniformly distributed over the inter-
val [0; xe
0
(b0)]. Without much loss of generality, assume ·
0(x) < 0 for all x. The
following lemma is a flrst step towards accounting for distributional efiects.
Lemma 2 Let b > b0 and 0:5 ‚x
e (b0) >x
e (b). Then:
1. For all x •xe (b0); we have J(x; b) < J(x; b0);W (x; b) > W (x; b0); U(b) >
U(b0):
2. For all x •xe
0
(b0), U(b)¡ U(b0) ‚ W (x; b)¡W (x; b0).
3. Let x > x0. Then: W (x; b)¡W (x; b0) ‚W (x
0; b)¡W (x0; b0). In particu-
lar:
a) If both x; x0 2 [0; xe (b)], thenW (x; b)¡W (x; b0) = W (x
0; b)¡W (x0; b0);
b) If x 2 [xe (b); xe
0
(b0)] and x
0 2 [0; xe
0
(b0)] ; then W (x; b)¡W (x; b0) >
W (x0; b)¡W (x0; b0):
That is, raising b (ignoring the costs of flnancing it) increases the reser-
vation wage of workers and the value of the human assets of all workers (both
employed and unemployed), whereas it decreases the value of flrms (part 1).
However, the efiects are not symmetric. Unemployed workers makes the largest
gains (part 2). Furthermore, some richer employed workers beneflt less than
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some poorer co-workers (part 3). To understand why, observe that a group of
relatively poor workers, namely those whose mismatch ranges in the interval
x 2 [xe (b); xe
0
(b0)] ; are employed in jobs which turn non-profltable when the
beneflts go up to b: These workers beneflt from the change.8 These poor workers
therefore receive an implicit or explicit premium over the wage increase which
accrues to their richer, better-matched colleagues (part 3b). The welfare gains
of all workers belonging to this richer group are instead equal, irrespective of x
(part 3a).
Next, we consider the cost of flnancing the system. Assume that the sys-
tem is flnanced through lump sum taxes, levied on all workers (both employed
and unemployed), and that, at each t; all workers (both employed and unem-
ployed) have to pay a tax equal to ¿ = but. Let T denote the asset value
of ‘being a tax-payer’ of a country in which the unemployed receive the gross
beneflt b: Then:
T (b; u0) = ¡b
Z
1
0
e¡rtut(b; u0)dt: (19)
T (b; u0) is a decreasing function of b; since the higher b the larger the flscal
burden to flnance the provision. Since all workers are subject to the same tax
burden, while the gains from raising unemployment beneflts depend on their
employment status (Lemma 2), we can state the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Let b > b0. Assume that, at t = 0; u0 = u
¤(b0) and y0 = y
¤(b0)
(where stars denote steady-states). Then (unless all workers unanimously prefer
b to b0 or b0 to b), 9
^
x2 [xe (b); xe
0
(b0)] such that all the unemployed and all
workers employed at a distance x ‚ x^ prefer b to b0, while all workers employed
at a distance x < x^ prefer b0 to b:
Proposition 3 establishes that, unless workers have unanimous views, there
is a con°ict of interests between workers with the option of increasing beneflts
gathering the support of the unemployed and the \poorer" employed workers,
and the opposition of the \richer" employed workers. This case is represented
by Fig. 4 (where NW (x; b) = W (x; b) + T (b) and NU(b) = U (b) + T (b)). In
this case, although harmful to well-matched workers (the NW schedule shifts
to the left), the increase of the unemployment beneflts from b0 to b increases
8If, on the one hand, ¯rms can lay-o® workers at no cost, these workers will become
unemployed. However, the entitlements to receive bene¯ts plus the perspective of getting a
better job in future make these \poor" workers better o®. If, on the other end, there are
¯ring restrictions and workers are entitled to earn more than what the Nash rule would grant
them (according to equation (18)), the improvement takes the form of a higher wage.
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the welfare of the \poor" workers holding a job in the range [x^; „xe
0
], as well as
of all the unemployed.
[Fig. 4 around here]
Note, to conclude, that if beneflts were flnanced, more realistically, by
linear (or progressive) income taxation, or pay-roll taxes, this would reinforce
the alignment of interests between the \working poor" and unemployed workers.
5 Calibration: the United States vs. Europe
5.1 Unemployment, output growth and inequality: the 70’s vs.
the 90’s
In this section, we present the result of a numerical solution of the model with
calibrated parameters, which illustrates how the model can successfully mimic
some key features of the contrasting behaviour of the labour markets in Western
Europe and the United States in the last two decades.
In order to obtain numbers comparable with the data, we introduce a trend
of neutral technical change. More precisely, we assume that b, c, and ·(x) grow
at the exogenous rate g. It is easily shown that the steady-state equilibrium in
the presence of neutral technical change is given by a simple modiflcation of (10)
and (12), whereby the interest rate (r) is replaced by the difierence between the
interest rate and the rate of technical change (r¡g). In particular, the solution
characterised by Proposition 1 remains true up to replacing r by r ¡ g, and
neither the tightness of the labour market nor the reservation distance changes
over time. Note that for technical progress to be neutral, the productivity of all
matches must grow at the same rate, i.e. ·t+k(x) = e
gk·t(x) for all x: If technical
progress is non-neutral, the importance of mismatch changes over time, and this
afiects the agents’ equilibrium behaviour.
We will consider two hypothetical economies which only difier by the ex-
tent of unemployment insurance, b. One economy, denoted by U , will be as-
sumed to have no unemployment insurance (b = 0), and will be interpreted as
a US-type laissez faire economy9. The other economy, denoted by E, provides
9Here we follow Mortensen (1996b) who argues that the limited extent of unemployment
bene¯ts in most states of the United States results in a non-positive e®ect of bene¯ts on
reservation wages.
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the unemployed with beneflts of unlimited duration (b > 0, flnanced by lump
sum taxes charged from all workers, both employed and unemployed), and can
be interpreted as a typical welfare state European country. The two economies
will be identical in all other parameters.
We assume that the two countries are initially at their respective steady-
states, which we interpret as the situation in the early 70’s. Then, both
economies are hit by a common, unanticipated shock increasing the impor-
tance of mismatch, by widening the productivity gap between the best (x = 0)
and the worst (x = 1
2
) job that a worker can perform. The new steady state
will be interpreted as the situation in the nineties.
We calibrate the parameters as follows. We interpret a time period of unit
length to be one quarter, and set the interest rate equal to 0:01125, implying an
annual interest rate of 4:5%. The rate of neutral technical change is assumed to
be 1% per year (thus, g = 0:0025). The separation rate is set equal to d = 0:04,
implying an average duration of a match of about six years. Although this
duration might seem fairly long { especially for the United States { it should
be noticed that we are here considering the duration of employment spells, not
of jobs (i.e, we ignore job-to-job movements). Since in this experiment we do
not want to introduce exogenous difierences between Europe and the United
States other than b, we flnd that this flgure is reasonable. We parameterise the
mismatch function according to the linear speciflcation given by equation (1),
and set the initial minimum productivity (·l;0) equal to 2:25, a normalisation
without any particular importance. Furthermore, we set a0 = 0:5 implying
that each agent is 22% more productive in his best than in his worst possible
occupation, and let ° = 4, implying that each worker is, to some extent, skilled
in 50% of the possible employments. The bargaining power of both parties
is equal, so fl = 0:5; corresponding to the symmetric Nash solution, and the
elasticity of the matching function is constant with fi = 0:5. Recall that when
fi = fl the equilibrium with no beneflts is e–cient. The hiring cost is assumed
to be equal to foregoing the production °ow of one low-productivity worker, i.e.
c0 = 2:25. Leisure is assumed to be worthless. In E, the welfare state economy,
unemployed workers receive a subsidy equal to 50% of the wage paid to the worst
paid workers (in both the initial and flnal period). Although this is less than the
average subsidy granted to unemployed workers in many European countries, in
reality beneflts have usually a limited duration. Moreover, accepting a job has
normally a positive in°uence on the level of future beneflts, hence we regard
this flgure as a realistic approximation of the impact of the beneflts on the
reservation wages.
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The skill-biased technical change shock is captured by an increase in the
parameter a above its trend in both countries. In particular, a is assumed to in-
crease from a0 = 0:5 to a1 = 0:85. As a result, in the flnal steady-state the best
matched worker’s productivity exceeds the worst matched worker’s productivity
by about 38%: Table 1 summarises the results, by comparing the steady-states
of the two economies before (steady-state 1) and after (steady-state 2) the shock.
We will regard the time elapsed between the initial and flnal situation as ap-
proximately twenty years. In the initial period, all workers in both economies
accept matches along the entire circle, i.e. x= 1
2
. The resulting unemployment
rates do not difier a great deal, although, not surprisingly, unemployment is
higher in E (5.5%) than in U (3.9.%). The average duration of unemployment
is about four months in U , and 5.7 months in E. The wage distribution is very
similar in the two countries, and so are output and productivity. Note that total
output is initially slightly larger in U than in E. In the flnal steady-state, the
situation looks dramatically difierent. The unemployment rate remains almost
the same in U (3.8%) but increases substantially in E (11%). The explanation
of this diverging behaviour is that in E, where the cost of unemployment is
lower due to insurance, the optimal search behaviour changes. In response to
the shock which increases the gap between their productivity in suitable and un-
suitable occupations, they become more selective and lower the cut-ofi distance
to „x = 0:219. In U , instead, where unemployment is a more painful experi-
ence, agents continue to rush into any employment. As a result, although the
vacancy-to-unemployment ratio does not change signiflcantly in either country,
the average duration of unemployment, stable in country 1, doubles in country
2, increasing to over one year. For the same reason, the share of long-term un-
employment grows substantially in E, where, after the shock, it takes more than
six months for more than half of the unemployed workers to exit unemployment,
while, for almost 30%, it takes more than a year.10
10The predictions of the model as to the change in the share of long-term unemployment are
consistent with the evidence that this share has increased substantially in Europe, whereas
there has hardly been any change in the United States. On the other hand, the model is not
entirely successful in some of its quantitative predictions. First, it predicts a lower share of
long term unemployment in Europe than what we observe. Second, and more important, it
fails to recognise that long-term unemployment was already high in Europe during the 70's.
In 1989, about 70% of the unemployed in Europe had to wait more than six months before
¯nding employment (vs. 53% in our model), and about 50% had to wait for more than one
year.
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Table 1. Comparison between steady-states.
steady-state 1 steady-state 2 % change
Cut-ofi, „x U 0.5 0.5
E 0.5 0.218
Unemployment rate U 3.9 3.8
E 5.5 11.1
Average duration of U 4.1 4.0
unemployment (months) E 5.8 12.5
Average productivity U 2.29 2.89 23.6
per employed E 2.31 3.15 30.8
Total output U 2.20 2.78 23.6
E 2.19 2.80 24.6
Percentage of unemployed U 14.1 13.6
with duration ‚ 6 months E 25.1 52.8
Percentage of unemployed U 2.0 1.8
with duration ‚ 12 months E 6.3 27.9
Ratio between U 1.107 1.173 6.6
highest lowest wage E 1.133 1.146 1.2
Ratio between U 1.087 1.142 5.5
90th-10th wage percentile E 1.086 1.116 3.1
Although workers experience longer unemployment spells in the welfare
state economy, they are on average better assigned to jobs. As a result, pro-
ductivity growth is higher in E (+31%) than in U (+24%). If we interpret
the period length as twenty years, this translates into average yearly growth
rates of 1.18% and 1.54%, respectively. The productivity gap is of the order
of 0.4% per year. The observed difierential of productivity growth between the
United States and Europe is about 1.1% per year, so this speciflcation of the
model predicts more than one third of the observed difierence. Furthermore,
note that total output growth is larger in country 2 than in country 1. Re-
markably, the model predicts that with standard parameters an economy with
11% unemployment rate can be more productive than an economy with 4%
unemployment rate, since very high employment is obtained in U at the cost of
larger mismatch.
The transitional dynamics of unemployment and output depends on whether
unproductive matches can be costlessly destroyed. If we rule out the possibility
of instantaneous distraction, we have the following patterns. In the economy
without insurance, unemployment is almost constant, whereas in the economy
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with insurance the unemployment rate flrst grows rapidly and, then, settles
down at the new steady-state level. As far as output is concerned, the two
economies start from very similar levels, and the economy with welfare state
reaches some higher output level at the new steady-state. However, the cost of
this better performance in the long run is a sharp initial recession. The output
in the economy with welfare state remains below that of the economy without
insurance for about ten years. Twenty years after the shock, all variables in both
economies are very close to their respective steady-state, and this justifles our
interpretation of the steady-state flgures of Table 1 as the situation prevailing
in the 70’s and the 90’s. If flrms could instead exit at no cost, unemployment
in E would jump upwards upon the occurrence of the shock, overshooting the
steady-state level. In particular, more than half of the existing jobs would sud-
denly be destroyed, causing a dramatic boom of unemployment. Unemployment
would then gradually fall to its new steady-state level, which would be the same
as steady-state 2 in Table 1.
Table 1 also shows that the model correctly predicts the qualitative changes
in wage inequality, although the quantitative efiects are fairly small. As noticed
earlier, the model has predictions about within group wage inequality, which,
as shown in the Introduction, has grown in the United States more than in
Europe. As shown in the two last rows of Table 1, our model predicts a signifl-
cantly larger increase in wage inequality in the economy without unemployment
insurance than in the one with insurance, and this is valid for both the ratio
between the highest and the lowest wage and the ratio between the 90th and the
10th percentile. The explanation of this difierence is that while many workers in
U accept jobs which are highly unsuitable to their characteristics, and therefore
receive a low wage, poor matches are not formed in E. This reduces the spread
of the wage distribution. Thus, although both economies were hit by an intrin-
sically unequalising shock, this is partially ofiset, in the welfare state economy,
by the change of attitudes of the unemployed. On the contrary, in E, the in-
crease of the productivity difierentials between good and bad matches is entirely
passed through to increasing wage difierentials between \lucky" well-matched
workers and \unlucky" badly matched workers.
5.2 The welfare state dilemma: winners and loosers
The calibrated version of the model presented above can also be used for assess-
ing some of the distributional efiects discussed in section 3. Consider country
E, and assume that, when the mismatch biased technological shock occurs, the
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agents living in E can choose whether to keep the status quo (unemployment
insurance), or dismantling the system of beneflt provision (like in country U)
in order to avoid the increase of unemployment. As we will see, this choice will
raise a con°ict of interests between agents with difierent employment status.
Recall that, when the shock occurs, the economy is in a steady-state,
where the unemployment rate is 5.5%. We assume, here, that flrms cannot lay
ofi workers when matches turn unprofltable, but, according to equation (18),
existing jobs must be continued and workers paid no less than their reserva-
tion wage. First, consider the \rich", well-matched workers whose jobs remain
profltable after the shock (i.e., x 2 [0; 0:219]). If unemployment beneflts were
abolished, these workers would sufier a wage cut (compared with the status
quo) due to the loss of bargaining power in the wage negotiation (outside op-
tion efiect). In our calibrated economy, the loss, as measured by the asset value
difierence between being employed in a match x with and without beneflts is
equal to W (x; b)¡W (x; 0) = 12:0 (recall that, by Lemma 2, the welfare change
is identical for all well-matched workers, such that x 2 [0; 0:219]). Consider,
next, the unemployed. We expect that the unemployed would loose more than
the employed workers from cutting beneflts to zero. In fact, the measured
loss is, in their case, equal to U(b) ¡ U(0) = 13:2. The loss of the \poor"
employed workers (such that x 2 [0:219; 0:5]) is bounded between the loss of
the rich workers and that of the unemployed. All agents, however, would gain
from tax reduction. Since we assume uniform lump sum taxes, this gain is the
same for all workers, both employed and unemployed. The present discounted
cost of flnancing the existing beneflt system with the perspective of growing
unemployment (see equation (19)) is T (b) = 13:0.
As these numbers immediately show, the unemployed are better ofi with
than without beneflts (since 13:2 > 13:0), while well-matched workers would
prefer a no-insurance system (12:0 < 13:0). A large share of the working poor,
however will also gain from the provision of beneflts. In particular, it turns out
that all employed workers with x > 0:242 will be better ofi with than without
insurance, whereas all ‘richer’ workers with x < 0:249 are worse ofi without
insurance. Since employed workers are initially homogeneously distributed in
the interval x 2 [0; 0:5] this means that about 50% the employed workers,
together with all the unemployed (5.5% of the working population), would prefer
to preserve the welfare state, even though the efiects on unemployment are
perfectly predicted. Note that the results change if we assume that unproductive
matches can be terminated. In this case, unemployment would have boomed
upon the occurrence of the technological shock, and the cost of keeping the
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existing welfare state system would have become prohibitively high. In this case,
all workers (including the unemployed) would support a laissez-faire oriented
reform.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how a search equilibrium model, where agents
have difierently skills for performing difierent tasks, can capture the main facts
regarding the contrasting performances of the United States and Continental
European labour markets. In our simulated results, the contrast arises from
the difierent responses to a mismatch-biased technological shock, which are
the result of difierences in unemployment insurance (or social norms regarding
unemployment protection). Although the scope of our \calibration" is mainly
illustrative, we believe that the results are insightful to assess the trade-ofi
involved in unemployment protection policies (unemployment vs. mismatch).
Our results complement other explanations of the \contrasting performance
of the United States and European labour markets" that explore alternative
mechanisms and that may also be at work.
We believe that the theoretical model which we have constructed is of
independent theoretical interest, and is suitable to study a number of positive
or normative issues which have been ignored in this paper. Among them, the
impact of other labour policies; the transitional efiects of sectorial reallocations;
the relation between economic °uctuations and employment mismatches, etc.
In the current development of the model, we have made restrictive simplifying
assumptions that should be reassessed in the future. For instance, we have ruled
out on-the-job search, while mismatched workers have substantial incentives to
look for better matches while employed. Furthermore, the assumption of uni-
form initial distributions of unemployment needs to be addressed in more detail
by future work, by focussing on the stability property of the uniform steady-
state distribution considered here, and extending attention to non-stationary
solutions when the entire distribution of unemployment is the state variable of
the economy.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Stationarity implies that, for all (i; j) 2 [0; 2…]2 ; _J(i; j) = _V (i) = 0. Imagine
that, in contradiction with the Lemma, v(i) < v(i0) for some i; i0. Then, equation
(2) implies that:
V (i) = ¡c+ 1
2¼
q
³
v(i)
u
´ R
i+2¼
i
(J(i; ¿)) d¿
V (i0) = ¡c+ 1
2¼
q
³
v(i0)
u
´ R
i
0+2¼
i0
(J(i0; ¿)) d¿
(20)
Equations (3)-(8), in turn, imply that:
J(i; j) = (r + d)¡1
³
(1¡ fl)
³
·(di; j)¡ b´´¡ fl'(j)
Hence, for any • 2 [0; 2…]:
Z
·+2¼
·
(J(i; ¿)) d¿ = (r + d)¡1 ((1¡ fl) (·^ ¡ b))¡ fl'^ = J^
where ·^ =
R
·+2¼
·
·(d•; ¿)d¿ and '^ = R ·+2¼
·
'(¿)d¿: Thus:
V (i) = ¡c+
1
2…
q
Ã
v(i)
u
!
J^ > ¡c+
1
2…
q
Ã
v(i0)
u
!
J^ = V (i0) (21)
where the sign of the inequality follows from the properties of the matching function,
q(:). But (21) contradicts the assumption of free-entry, which implies that V (i) =
V (i0) = 0: Thus, v(i) must be equal to v(i0). QED.
Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the Proposition through simple geometrical arguments.
To prove existence, we will ¯rst establish that either the Vacancy creation
schedule (V C) lies entirely to the left of the Skill allocation schedule (SA), or the
two schedules cross; we then establish that in both cases an equilibrium exists. To
rule out that V C is entirely to the right of SA, observe that (a) from (11), the SA
schedule intersects the horizontal axis in correspondence of µ = (1¡¯)
¯c
(·u ¡ b) > 0;
(b) for (12) to be satis¯ed, it must be the case that as „x! 0, µ ! 0 (which implies
that q(µ)!1), therefore the V C schedule starts from the origin. Hence, at x= 0;
V C is always to the left of SA. Assume that V C is entirely to the left of SA. Then,
it is easy to check that the solution
³
µe = µ¤¤; xe= 1
2
´
satis¯es the conditions (10)
(or, alternatively, (11)) and (12) { the former holding with strict inequality { and is,
therefore, an equilibrium. Assume, instead, that V C and SA intersect. Then, it is
immediate to show that any intersection point identi¯es an equilibrium.
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To prove uniqueness, we show that the two schedules can cross at most once,
except for non-generic parameter con¯gurations. De¯ne:
‘p(µ; „x) · (1¡ fl)(·(x)¡ b)¡ flcµ;
‘v(µ; x) · ¡c (r + d+ fl2 x µq(µ)) + (1¡ fl)2 x q(µ)
³
· (x)¡ b
´
;
where ‘p(µ; „x) = 0 and ‘v(µ; x) = 0 implicitly de¯ne, respectively, the SA and V C
schedules. First, observe that ‘v
1
(µ; „x) < 0: Then, standard di®erentiation shows that
V C is positively (negatively) sloped if and only if ‘v
2
(µ; „x) > (<)0. Next, observe
that ‘v
2
(µ; „x) = (1 ¡ fl)(·(x) ¡ b) ¡ flcµ (to obtain this result, we use the fact
that from the de¯nition of · (x) it follows that ·
0
(x) x= ·(x)¡ · (x)). Hence,
sign [‘v
2
(µ; „x)] = sign [(1¡ fl)(·(x)¡ b)¡ flcµ] = sign [‘p(µ; „x)] . This implies
that V C is positively sloped when it lies to the left of SA (since in this region
‘p(µ; „x) > 0), negatively sloped when it lies to the right of SA (since in this region
‘p(µ; „x) < 0) and vertical when the two schedules intersect (since ‘p(µ; „x) = 0 along
SA). Since SA is everywhere non-positively sloped, the two schedules can cross at
most once. Multiple intersections between the schedules SA and V C (hence, multiple
equilibria) are only possible if µ¤ = µ¤¤ (that is, in a case like that of Fig. 1, but such
that the SA and V C
schedules coincide at „x = 1
2
). Clearly, this can only occur for non-generic
parameter con¯gurations. Ruling out this non-generic case, it is straightforward to
check that when the two schedule cross in an interior point, no corner solution is an
equilibrium. Viceversa, if the two schedules do not cross, there is a unique corner
solution equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium is, generically, unique.
Finally, the inspection of Figs. 1 and 2 immediately reveals that the equilibrium
is interior if and only if µ¤ < µ¤¤ and is a corner solution if and only if µ¤ ‚ µ¤¤.
Hence, part b of the Proposition. QED.
Derivation of equations (10), (11) and (12).
All equations are derived by setting time derivatives in the Bellman equations
equal to zero, since we are searching for a stationary solution. Also, we will use
throughout the following facts:
a) J(i; j) = J(di; j) = J(x); W (i; j) = W (di; j) = W (x); U (j) = U ; w(i; j) =
w(di; j) = w(x); ·(di; j) = ·(x) (see condition (9) in the text).
b)
R i+2¼
i Max [J(i; ¿); V (i)] d¿ =
R
1
0
Max [J(¿); 0] d¿ = 2
R
¹x
0
J(¿ ) d¿ andR j+2¼
j Max [W (¿; j)¡ U(j); 0] d¿ =
R
1
0 Max [W (¿)¡ U; 0] d¿ = 2
R
¹x
0 (W (¿)¡ U) d¿
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We ¯rst derive equation (10). The strategy is to search for „x such thatW („x) ‚
U and W („x) > U if „x < 1
2
. Using equations (5), (6), (7), we obtain:
(r + d)
fl
1¡ fl
J(x) = w(x)¡ b¡
fl
1¡ fl
2µq(µ)
Z
x
0
J(¿)d¿; (22)
Next, we use (3) to obtain the following expression for the . This gives the following
expression for the wage schedules:
w(x) = (1¡ fl)b + fl·(x) + 2flµq(µ)
Z
x
0
J(¿ )d¿ : (23)
From replacing (23) into (22), and simplifying terms, we obtain:
(r + d)J(x) = (1¡ fl) (·(x)¡ b)¡ fl2µq(µ)
Z
x
0
J(¿)d¿: (24)
Integrating on both sides of (24) gives:
Z
¹x
0
J(¿)d¿ = (r + d+ fl2„xµq(µ))¡1 (1¡ fl)
µZ
¹x
0
·(¿ )d¿ ¡ b„x
¶
(25)
Finally, we substitute (25) into (24) and obtain:
(r + d)J(x) = (1¡ fl) (·(x)¡ b)¡
(1¡ fl)fl2µq(µ)„x
r + d+ fl2„xµq(µ)
³
· (x)¡ b
´
(26)
where · is de¯ned in the text. Recall that Nash bargaining implies that, if „x < 1
2
,
W („x) ¡ U , J(„x) = 0: If, instead, we have a corner solution, however, J(x) > 0
for all x (and „x = 1
2
). Thus, the general condition is:
(·(x)¡ b)¡
fl2µq(µ)„x
r + d+ fl2„xµq(µ)
³
· (x)¡ b
´
‚ 0
which is the same as equation (10) in the text.
Next, we derive equation (11). Equations (3) and (8) imply (recalling that
'(j) = cµ for all j's) that (r + d)J(x) = (1 ¡ fl)·(x) ¡ flcµ ‚ 0, and this
establishes the result. QED.
To obtain equation (12), ¯nally, observe that equation (2) implies (given µ(i; ¿) =
µ) that c = 2
R
¹x
0
J(¿) d¿ . Substituting away
R
¹x
0
J(¿) d¿ using equation (25) yields
equation (12). QED.
Proof of Lemma 3. Part 1.From (3) and (8) we have, for all x 2 [0; xe (b)],
J(x; b)¡J(x; b0) = w(x; b0)¡w(x; b) = (1¡¯)(b0¡b)+¯c(µ(b0)¡µ(b)) = (1¡¯)[´(x
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(b0))¡ ´(x (b))] < 0: (Note that this expression is independent of x; this observation
will be useful in the proof of part 3). This inequality holds true, a fortiori, for
x >x
e (b). Also, from (2), (4), (6), (7) and (8) we have U(b) ¡ U(b0) = (1 ¡ ¯)(b ¡
b0)¡
¯
1¡¯
[J(x; b)¡ J(x; b0)] < 0. Finally, from (5) we have that W (x; b)¡W (x; b0) =
w(x; b)¡ w(x; b0) + d [U(b)¡ U(b0)] > 0.
Part 2. From (7), we have that, for all x 2 [0; xe (b)] W (x; b) ¡W (x; b0) =
U(b)¡U(b0)+
¯
1¡¯
[J(x; b)¡ J(x; b0)]. Since, from part 1, J(x; b)¡J(x; b0) < 0, then
W (x; b)¡W (x; b0) < U(b)¡ U(b0). Next, consider the range x 2 [x
e (b0); x
e (b)] : In
this range, (5) and (18), imply that W (x; b) = U(b). But, since W (x; b0) > U(b0),
then W (x; b)¡W (x; b0) < U(b)¡ U(b0) also in this range of x's.
Part 3. The proof of part 1 shows that in the range x 2 [0; xe (b)], J(x; b) ¡
J(x; b0) is independent of x. But, then, from (7), W (x; b)¡W (x; b0) is also indepen-
dent of x, and this proves part (a). To prove part (b) we consider ¯rst the case in
which x0 2 [0; xe (b)], and then the case in which x0 2 [xe (b); xe (b0)]. In the former
case: W (x; b)¡W (x; b0) = U(b)¡W (x; b0) > U(b)¡U(b0)+
¯
1¡¯
[J(x; b)¡ J(x; b0)] =
U(b) ¡ U(b0) +
¯
1¡¯
[J(x0; b)¡ J(x0; b0)] = W (x
0; b) ¡W (x0; b0) . In the latter case:
W (x; b) ¡W (x; b0) = U(b) ¡W (x; b0) > U(b) ¡W (x
0; b0) = W (x
0; b) ¡W (x0; b0).
QED.
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Fig. 1: Interior solution.
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Fig. 2: Corner solution.
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Fig. 3: Efiect of an increase of b.
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Fig. 4: Political Economy.
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